

**THE PORT:
THE ENTANGLEMENT OF RELIGION AND
THE URBAN IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN INDONESIA**

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(image: courtesy of Kompas newspaper)

1. Introduction

This chapter looks at the process of a recent urban renewal project intersect in contemporary Jakarta. The case is the interruption of an area development project located at the harbor area of the city by the revelation of a Hadrami-saint tombs in the area. It was April 14, 2010; since morning, all TV stations repeatedly broadcast breaking news on a bloody clash in Jakarta's planned International harbor area over the removal of Habib Hasan Al-Hadad's tomb. The clash occurred between public order officers (Satpol PP) who wanted

to remove the tomb from the site and the followers who defended it. Three people died and hundreds more were injured. In a split second, the tomb received national attention and the president proposed granting it a national heritage status. The number of visitors to the saint's tomb multiplied overnight. Four months after the event, however, the council of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (MUI) presented their investigation on the clash and the tomb's history with the conclusion that the tomb was actually a fraud, and declared Habib Hasan not to be a saint. This case can lead us to explore several questions, i.e. What kind of urban and religious elements play in this landscape reconfiguration and saint-making practice? How does one understand them from the historical perspective of Jakarta? Highlighted in the processes is the practice of making crowds in order to legitimate their existence: how does media visibility play in the violent event? How is this case related to the current popularity of Hadrami-descendent Muslim scholars' religious movements in the city?

The phenomenon of urban religion is not limited to Indonesia, as some studies have chronicled the proliferation of novel Islamic movements in megacities (Roy 2006; Meuleman 2002; Alsayyad 2010; Pinxten and Dikomitis 2009). However, few studies have adequately addressed the role of urban practice as the productive exertion in forming the religious movements. On the one hand, seeing the city as a mere "container" for religious phenomena, the general portrayal frames Islamic movement as a form of escapism from modern crisis. On the other hand, in terms of macro-micro perspective, it commonly understands that a religious movement is a by-product of a national and global political transformation. These kinds of general portrayals fail to ask how and

why the movement emerges in the city and in turn becomes entangled in urban issues such as urban renewal/development or contesting public space.

Tanjung Priok 1984

Background. Tanjung Priok has a pivotal position in the history of Indonesian political Islam, marked by the tragic massacre in 1984. The 1984 Tanjung Priok Massacre claimed at least 24 lives, with 54 more injured and still others missing. The massacre was one of the political events that erupted in the 80s following the systematic ideological homogenization by President Suharto's New Order regime imposed on national political entities, including the Islamic ones. Distinguished as a nationalist and secular regime, Soeharto's government had forced Islamic political groups – in the parliament as well as outside it—to acquire “Pancasila” as their sole ideological principle (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003; Ramage 1997). Pancasila is the national basic philosophy, which at the beginning of Indonesian independence movement expressed universal humanity. Soeharto's regime used Pancasila as an ideological tool to repress resistance groups, the rightist as well as the leftist movements.

Soeharto established and narrated his regime (1965-1998) as the “New Order” regime so as to articulate the new agenda for the nation: to expedite economic development for the goal of improving national prosperity. Soeharto professed that he required political stability to bring Indonesia towards outstanding national development. This narration got its legitimation by pointing to the traumatic experience period of “experimental” democracy during 1957-1965 under President Soekarno. In Soekarno's era, Indonesia was in an inferior situation. Politically, it was overwhelmed by enormously ruptured and intense struggle. Soekarno had an ambition to build the nation based on strong political

collaboration between the three most important political elements at that time: the army, the communist, and the Islamic groups. The economy was in chaos. There was little movement in the private sector investment and industrialization. The inflation was about 1000 percent, rendering the government barely able to provide minimal standard of administrative service. Soeharto labeled Soekarno's regime as the "Old Order" to contrast it with his own regime that offered a new direction for national character building: capitalism.

Nationalism and capitalism require violence to enlarge its supremacy. In 1966, Soeharto used the "G30S" event as the "pretext" to eliminate the communists in Indonesia (Roosa 2006). The 1965 massacre claimed the lives of about one million people. Subsequently, Soeharto kept using violence and aligning with the military wing to silence various critical groups: students, intellectuals, and Islamic groups to create political stability, to secure the economic development processes. At least two major political protests occurred in the 1970s, rallying against the aggressive expansion of foreign investment and the emergence and consolidation of new capital-owning class/giant business conglomerates. The 1980s as the victorious moment of the authoritarian regime demanded increased political stability to ensure the high and stable level of economic growth. Therefore, the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre occurred in the parallel year when Indonesia was acclaimed for achieving national rice self-sufficient.

Tanjung Priok as a backdoor area. How did the political crisis in the 1980s – the massacre – take place in Tanjung Priok, the "backdoor area" of Jakarta? At that time, Jakarta had experienced a major transformation of its

infrastructure as well as its social and economic life. The first decade of Soeharto's regime being focused on economic development, Jakarta as the capital city became the “display window” for national prosperity and progress.

Ali Sadikin, a charismatic governor elected in 1966, had to sustain the previous ambition of Soekarno in making Jakarta a representation of the nation. However, Sadikin also thought that Jakarta should be an excellent metropolitan city in terms of providing service and utilities for the process of industrialization. The target was to transform Jakarta into a competent business city to compete with neighboring Singapore.

During Ali Sadikin's term (1965-1978), Jakarta experienced a substantial and progressive process of “beautification” in new direction compared to the former, post-independence period (Silver 2008; Kusno 2000). Sadikin remained focused on programs building monumental structures for reasons of national pride and representation. For instance, he finished the project of President Soekarno (1945-1966) of constructing the national mosque, Istiqlal, which was located in the heart of the city. Sadikin also built Ancol (a entertainment park), Taman Mini Indonesia Indonesia (a theme park on Indonesian diversity), Sarinah (a shopping center) and Senayan (the parliament building). In the same vein, Sadikin worked energetically to develop a comfortable environment for the new elite class born from the 70's oil boom and industrialization. He created, for the first time, a 20-year plan called *Master Plan of Djakarta 1965-1985*. The master plan favored urban structures that could support business and industrial activities: elevated highways, high-rise towers and real estate housings. Most of these infrastructures were built in the central part of city and spreading toward the south.

Urban renewal is never pro-poor, especially in a city like Jakarta where the spatial transformation into a metropolis was done under the control of a military state. Along those urban elite infrastructures, there were off-street settlements for lower-income people. They were called *kampung*, largely peopled by indigenous residents (the *Betawi*) as well as migrants from rural areas. The *kampung* is synonymous with dense neighborhoods similar to rural villages punctuated with a matrix of footpaths and poor sanitary facility. Some *kampung* areas had been gentrified for new upper-class residency through a violent process conducted by the government and supported by the military. Even though Sadikin declared Jakarta to be a closed city to migrants, he created the *kampung* improvement program (*MH Thamrin* program) to rehabilitate the footpaths and sanitation facility.

The contrast between metropolitan entities and *kampung* areas is the keyframe to look at the spatial formation of Jakarta. Tanjung Priok as an area with an international and national hub for the sea network was configured in a similar way. Until the beginning of the 80s, Tanjung Priok remained underdeveloped. The government was only concerned with the seaport but not the surrounding neighborhoods. Maloko remembered that Tanjung Priok was essentially the backdoor of Jakarta. Most of the area was still covered by rice fields and swamps. "Therefore *Bang Ali*, the governor, built *Kramat Tunggak* here in Priok. People said Priok was the place where mischievous spirits would dump the little children they had kidnapped ("*jin buang anak*")¹. So it's the

¹ Interview with Syarifin Maloko, October 2011

perfect place for Jakarta's brothels!" Maloko told me. Kramat Tunggak was the only major and legal brothel built by Sadikin.

Maloko was born on Roti Island, Eastern Indonesia. It takes more than a week to travel from Roti to Tanjung Priok by boat. Maloko arrived in 1968 after finishing school to continue his education at *Pendidikan Tinggi Dakwah Indonesia* (PTDI – the Indonesian Institute for Islamic Preachers), which was also located in Priok. The area was overwhelmed by *kampungs* of migrants. Maloko and other migrants, who entered Jakarta by sea, usually consider Priok as the stepping stone settlement before moving on to other locations. "Priok is the enclave for migrants. In the '80s, the only way to survive was by working at the port. It was highly competitive. So, it was very natural for the people here to be temperamental and aggressive; but at the same time, they were pious Muslims. Islam as an identity helps the migrants to make an identification among them.

The Massacre. Going into 1984, the tension between the State, the military and Islamic groups was high. It was escalated by General Soeharto's 1980 speech which announced the urgency to legalize Pancasila as the sole basic principle for all political parties and mass organizations. In 1982, there was a profound bloody clash between the supporters of PPP (the only Islamic political party) and Golkar (the government party) in Jakarta during the national election campaign. Many Muslim politicians observed Soeharto's agenda with Pancasila as a part of his tactic in silencing the Islamic political forces.

The government and the military painstakingly banned political rallies organized by Muslim politicians. "In Jakarta, there were a lot of organizations, HMI (the student Muslim organization) or others, who tried to organize public mass rallies but the military always succeeded in putting an end to the activities.

It was odd that the military did not ban the public speech in Priok,” said Maloko. AM Fatwa, a prominent politician, also made a similar observation. Toward September 1984, he got several invitations from Priok political activities to come and made a speech in Priok. Fatwa said, “Some friends advised me not to go to Priok. Instead, we invited them to come to our place in south Jakarta to discuss the current political situation.”²

The political situation in Priok heated up with the growing number of public gatherings. Every week, Maloko, Amir Biki, M. Nasir and other Priok political activists organized the gathering and tens of thousands would come. “It was the biggest ever conducted in Indonesia,” Maloko boasted. They often invited Ulema and Islamic preachers from outside Priok to give a speech in the event. He described how the tools in creating the crowds were just simple pamphlets and plenty of 25-watt TOA speakers. Malokok and his friends did not realize that the pamphlets would later become the cause of the massacre.

The story of the massacre began on September 10th (Tapol 1987; Tempo 1984). The study group of *As-Saadah* had put up a large number of posters announcing an Islamic congregation (*pengajian*) on the 12th. The posters mentioned the phrase “...national disintegration”. Some other sources pointed out the anti-Chinese and anti-Christian tone in the posters. On Friday, September 8th, platoon sergeant Hermanu entered the prayer room of *As-Saadah* Mosque to negotiate with some members of the study group to take down the posters as they were critical towards the government. The Sergeant entered the mosque without taking off his shoes. He searched through tables and the lectern for

² Interview with AM Fatwa November 2011

evidence. As the negotiation failed and the young men did not care for the warning, the Sergeant used water from a storm drain to remove the posters displayed outside.

Two days later, several members of the study group went to the local civil defense post and met Sergeant Hermanu. They demanded that the sergeant apologize of what he had done on the previous Friday. Insisting that he was just doing his job, Sergeant Hermanu refused to apologize. Suddenly, someone threw sand into the post. In a split second, someone had burnt down the sergeant's motorbike. The situation turned into chaos and it led to the arrest of four people at the North Jakarta Military Area command. The village chiefs and several mosque leaders in the neighborhood decided to ask Amir Biki as the local Muslim leader to assist in releasing the detainees on the next day. Amir Biki and several supporters went to the military post and articulated his demand to release the detainees by 11 p.m. the next day.

On September 12th – the next day – the congregation was conducted by the study group (*majelis*) in the evening on Sindang Street as announced. The congregation featured several local scholars including Sarifin Maloko and Moh. Nasir. Before the event started, Amir Biki called the military post and talked to Captain Sriyanto. He restated his demand on the detainees. Unforeseen, the committee asked Amir Biki to give a speech –something unusual as Biki was more prominent as a pious local leader than an Islamic scholar. On the lectern, he explained to the audience, mainly young men, that he urged the audience to peacefully march to the military station if the military did not release the detainees by 11 PM. “If anyone acts destructively in the march, then that person is not our brother!” Biki emphasized (Fatwa 2005).

At 11 p.m. it was certain that the detainees would not be delivered to the lectern. Amir Biki led the march to the military station. A crowd of about 3,000 young men walked by shouting "Allah is the greatest". As soon as they reached a police station close to the military station, the massive crowd was blocked by three military platoons under the command of Captain Sriyanto. The platoons blocked the way to the military station. As the military and the people faced each other, the crowd decided to sit down on the street. Later, the military stepped back and began to fire live bullets into the crowd. The shooting lasted 20 minutes. The crowd scattered all over the place. Amir Biki, who led the crowd, was shot in the first place. Another troop with tanks came from another direction and attacked the crowd. Another crowd of ordinary people who arrived at the clash site from another street (*Ampera Street*) began to burn down houses and stores on the edge of the street. That night, an ambulance transported the dead and the injured to the military hospital and banned any other hospital from admitting the victim.

The military and the government officially announced the death toll in the massacre as "only" 9 people dead and 53 injured. They also announced 12 motor vehicles, 2 houses, and one drugstore burnt down. These numbers were smaller than the numbers announced by independent investigators, the mass media and the testimony of the victims. The government did not label this incident as a riot by an Islamic group, claiming instead that it was done by mere "a rebellious group". *Tempo*, the most important news magazine at that time, published a report based on its on-site investigation and found that at least 28 people had died. *Petisi 50*, a critical study group of former Indonesian military generals released a white paper on the massacre, which cast doubt on the number of

victims in the government/military version. *Petisi 50* asserted the necessity to comprehend the incident as a human rights violation against the Islamic political wing and called for the government to form an impartial committee to investigate the case. A year after the incident, TAPOL (a UK-based NGO for human rights watch) published its report and give an estimation of hundreds of people actually dead or victimized in the incident. Some of the witnesses mentioned a death toll of 600 as it happened in a crowd (Tapol 1987).

In the following year, the court prosecuted at least 24 people for the Priok massacre. Of the 9 fatalities admitted by the government, only the body of Amir Biki, the crowd leader, was returned to the family, and the Muslim scholars in Priok decided to bury the corpse as a *syahid* (martyr). Hundreds of people remained missing, which then became the subject of human rights movement in the post Suharto era. *Kontras*, a Jakarta-based human rights organization, has worked with victims' families since 2004 to raise demand to the government to establish justice and political as well as social rehabilitation. The case, however, remains one of the dark periods in the 1980s as part of the New Order's process in making a figuration of Muslim Indonesia.

The Tomb of Mbah Priok.

Introduction. Twenty-six years after the Priok massacre, the area made headlines once more, and again it was related to Islamic issues. If the massacre in 1984 occurred approaching midnight, the 2010 riot took place during the day, broadcast by national TVs and getting profound media coverage. The riot was a national spectacle. The central issue of the incident is the tomb of a cleric named Habib Hasan bin Muhammad Al-Haddad, later famously called "*Mbah Priok*" (Priok grandfather). The tomb is located on land claimed by both the state-

owned operator of Tanjung Priok port, Pelindo company and heirs of the cleric. Koja, the area, has been part of a grand design to gentrify the area into a new large international port. The land on which the tomb is located is designated to be a container terminal area. The riot occurred on April 14, 2010 between Jakarta's Public Order Agency troops (*Satpol PP*), who wanted to remove the tomb, and the supporters who defended it.

The Riot. The tomb is located in Koja, the eastern part of Tanjung Priok, specifically on Dobo street. The tomb site consists of a 20-square-meter memorial complex (the tomb) and a 300-square meter area with erected buildings (a meeting hall and a shop) and a parking area. Two different gates divide the spot. In the bigger picture, the spot is part of a 145-hectare plot owned by PT. Pelindo who claims the tomb's presence as illegal and asked Jakarta government to help tear down the buildings (Madani Institute 2010).

It was on Wednesday when the troops of Public Order officers arrived at the location, at around 7 AM. The public order officers were at least 1,750-strong and accompanied by 200 policemen and 70 army soldiers. As soon as they arrived, up to 100 people blocked the tomb and started burning old tires. The officers also brought in heavy equipment to tear down the tomb and its buildings, such as tractors, bulldozers and excavators for the demolition operation. However, when the officers, police and soldiers attempted to enter the tomb, the defenders began to throw stones and Molotov bombs at the troops. The police responded with water guns and tear gas.

The police stopped the confrontation around 9.30 a.m. as Habib Selon from *Forum Pembela Islam* (FPI) arrived at the location along with three members of the Jakarta people's representative council. They agreed to negotiate

with heirs of the cleric and their advocate, Yan Juanda, in a nearby mosque outside the tomb. Meanwhile, people started coming to the clash area but were blocked by the police at the intersection about one kilometer from the tomb. Metro TV and TV One (two national TV news stations) as well as SCTV (general TV station) had been broadcasting the incident as breaking news since morning. In their breaking news, they had started titling the news the “Priok Tragedy” (Metro TV) or “The Bloody Tanjung Priok” (SCTV). This breaking news drew many to visit the incident with various motivations. Ijon, a 22-year-old young man, was shocked when he saw the breaking news about the demolition and decided to join the crowd. He had not expected the demolition to turn violent. Ijon had a friend, Adi, who joined the Islamic study group (*majelis ta’lim*) at the tomb. Ijon and others joined the crowd which was waiting at the end of Dobo street, the only access street to the tomb. The crowd grew larger towards the noon while the negotiation was in process.

Lori Siregar, a 27-year-old female reporter of *Metro TV*, arrived at the location around 10 a.m. when the riot had started a few hours earlier. “We had received information that the tomb would be demolished. However, no one expected the process would be followed by a huge riot,” said Lori. She joined the Metro TV team who had been on standby at the location since 7 a.m. Her main assignment was the national parliament building but then the main office called her to do live reporting in Priok. “It may have been because I have experience in reporting conflict news,” Lori believed.

The negotiation arrived at the agreement that the demolition should be postponed and all parties would bring the case to the court. Jakarta's governor, Fauzi Wibowo, immediately afterwards called the commander of police order

officers and asked him to pull out all the troops including the police and army from the location. When the troops were walking to their cars and preparing to leave, the crowd who had been waiting on the tip of Dobo Street managed to break through the police blockade. The residents burst toward the police and public order officers and started throwing stones. The clash erupted anew and the most of the residents were armed with machetes, sharp weapons and bamboos. The crowd also burnt down the vehicles of the police and public order officers. In this second eruption, two public order officers and one resident lost their lives. The Red Cross Indonesia reported that 119 people had been injured and over twenty-two billion rupiah's (USD 2,3 million) worth of vehicles had been burned. The clash lasted until midnight and the TV stations broadcast the incident live especially the peak of second clash which ran between noon and 6 PM.

Miracle, Myth, Heritage. The live broadcast of the Priok deadly clash's second phase has made a nationwide impact on people's perception of the existence of the tomb. People have been familiar with "Mbah Priok", as the cleric Habib Hasan bin Muhammad Al-Haddad was nicknamed, and the public opinion was on the tomb's defender side. All eyes pointed to Jakarta's government and public order officers as the villains. Having an unimpeachable position placed Mbah Priok descendants in high confidence to bargain with the government.

The day after the incident (April 15), the governor organized a meeting at the city hall to discuss thoroughly the clash and its solutions. At the meeting, the Mbah Priok's descendants, Habib Ali Alayidrus and Habi Sting Alatas broke off the deal they had made with the People' representative council to put forward the case to a judicial court. Now, they confidently asked the government to

preserve the mausoleum as an important *historical* site of Muslim Betawi. They demanded the government not only to maintain the 20 square-meter tomb but also the 45,000 square-meter area which included an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*). They started to articulate a notion of “cultural heritage” to understand the existence of tomb (*Kompas*, 2010). On behalf of “Jakarta muslim community”, Habib Rizieq from FPI (Islamic Defender Front) said, “If any legal action is taken for this case, the people will not support that initiative as they have distrusted the accountability of law. If Habib Hasan's family lose their land rights in court, people will think the law and the judge had been bribed. So, it is better for the government to negotiate with Mbah Priok's descendants.”

The major support came directly from the president. Two days after the incident, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono invited the cleric's heirs to meet him after Friday prayers at his palace. The president placated *Mbah Priok's* family with a personal pledge to protect the mausoleum. He strongly encouraged all parties involved in the case to keep their calm while starting the negotiation for the rest of the disputed area. Habib Ali Zaenal bin Abdurrahman Al Idrus, one of Mbah Priok's grandsons emphasized to journalists after the meeting that the president would sign a plaque declaring the tomb as a national cultural heritage.

I visited the tomb one afternoon in June 2010. It was during the month of *Sya'ban* according to Islamic calendar, the busiest month for traditionalist Muslims to circulate among sacred tombs for *ziyarah* (pilgrimage). The parking lot was packed with five intercity buses (52-seat capacity) and motorcycles. The visitors queued for taking *wudhu* (ablution) as one of the pilgrimage's requirements. They mainly wore the Arabic garb with long-sleeves and white cloths. Most of the visitors that afternoon were middle-aged men and women

with some young people accompanying them. It was apparent that most of the crew who organized the pilgrimage were young people.

I talked with one of the visitors, Mr. Sumarno (43), who came from Rangkas, a four-hour drive away from Jakarta, and performed the veneration annually during Sya'ban month. Last year, Mr. Sumarno visited four sacred tombs in Jakarta excluding Mbah Priok's tomb. "I just heard about this tomb because of the bloody clash. I am happy to be able to visit this famous place. I saw it on TV. I believe in the *keramat* (miracle) of Mbah Priok." Some other people also said that they paid the visit thanks to the proliferation of the Mbah Priok tragedy on various media, from TV to the internet. One of the adherents who worked at the tomb's gate said the number of people they received after the clash had doubled from the previous years.

Habib Ali Zaenal bin Abdurrahman Al Idrus and Habib Salim bin Umar Al Atas, two coordinators of the tomb have produced various forms in representing the figure of Mbah Priok. In principle, there are two important messages for the followers, (1) Mbah Priok or Habib Hasan Alhadad is a saint (*wali Allah*) who was born in Palembang, South Sumatra in 1727 and traveled to Jakarta for proselytizing as he had studied Islam in South Yemen. Unfortunately, his ship was wrecked by a storm and the cleric was found adrift on the coast of Jakarta, along with a cooking stove also known as *periuk* in Indonesian. Some local people found his corpse and buried him on shore with the remains of his paddle boat as the gravestone. The area was later called *Tanjung Priok* in his honor; (2) there had been previous attempts to evict Mbah Priok's grave. In the colonial period, the Dutch had to face the death of their workers when they were trying to convert the coastal area into a harbor. The Dutch asked the help of local clerics

to establish a spiritual communication with Mbah Priok. The Dutch were finally able to continue with the project after delivering the demands from Mbah Priok's spirit; that is, to relocate his corpse under the supervision of his family. His hagiography book says, "When the Dutch did the relocation, the corpse of Mbah Priok was still intact, fragrant, and his eyes closed with vibration." The book framed the 2010 clash as the other form of Mbah Priok's miracle as the small number of family members and followers were able to fight the government's forces, who were vastly superior in number, thanks to the help of various spirits: giants, angels, birds. The tomb management has materialized those icons associated with Mbah Priok into forms, from books to photographs, from t-shirts to stickers in order to mediate the process of canonization of the cleric as an important Islamic urban saint.



("The Haul (birthday celebration) of Habib Hasan Al-Haddad 2012 – courtesy of Aryo Danusiri)

Visibility and Mobility: saint-making and urban tactics

From the described case, I attempt to depict how visibility and invisibility of Islam in the Indonesian public sphere have been conceived. During the Soeharto era, the state pertained to obscure the relationships between Islam and politics. Reflected in the 1984 Tanjung Priok case, the state preferred to keep the people movement anonymous in a bid to veil “the real” political dynamics of that period. General LB Moerdani, representing the government, announced to the press that the clash had occurred between the military and “a rebellious group” instead of an Islamic group. The state controlled the press in reporting details of the clash and warning them not to write outside the official state version (McGregor 2007). As freedom of expression was strictly controlled by the state, very few people could access the reports on the 1984 clash that were written by independent groups and clandestinely circulated.

The New Order regime as a state of terror played between the seen and the unseen for the purpose of garnering its power. On the subject of the 1966 massacre, the state produced a six-hour propaganda film which amplified the violent figure of “the communist” as the example of *ekstrim kiri* (extreme left) which later proved useful in painting the other group, i.e. Islamic group, as the *ekstrim kanan* (extreme right). The state vulgarly put the rebellious Muslims in court for the bombing incidents of the '80s. This extreme left-right dichotomy was useful in positioning the New Order in the center as the one that supported the constitution and the national principle, *Pancasila*. The state terror was also taking form in violent performance in an urban setting in 1983 by showing in public the corpses of petty criminals, gang members and street toughs who were

killed mysteriously inside black jeeps and behind tinted glass window at night (Spyer 2002; Siegel 1998; Strassler 2004).

In the post-Suharto era, the state has reduced its control on the dynamics of public sphere and supported freedom of speech and expression. Transparency has become one of the ultimate political keywords in defining Indonesian reform as a part of the aspiration to build democracy and to fight corruption. The *reformasi* era is also a chance to reveal and recover political entities that have been obscured and concealed by various forms of national political hegemony. Therefore, political openness has changed visual public culture into a formation that is saturated by political figures that used to be oppressed by the state. This new visibility includes the “resurgence” of political Islam to inhabit the public sphere. This process of public culture reconfiguration has been parallel to the proliferation of violent conflict at various regions, which suggests links to ethnicity and religiosity. Simultaneously, one could observe frailty of the state in tackling this problem. Therefore, as Steedly reminds us (2013), we need to understand this reconfiguration of Indonesian public culture in conjunction with the dispersing of centralized power and the proliferation of ethnic and religious conflicts.

The visibility of Indonesian Islam in the public field has reshaped its formation. Several studies have suggested the derogatory impact on Islamic quality (Hasan 2009; Fealy and White 2008) in the process of being visible. These studies observe making Islam popular as modernization that threatens the purity of Islam. In a similar vein, other studies on Indonesian politics propose the failure of *reformasi* in giving the citizens “true” democracy (Nordholt and Klinken 2007; O’Rourke 2003; Stockmann 2004). Both kinds of studies presuppose an

ideal type of Islam and democracy and see the process of visibility as a practice that erodes it. In contrast to that, I follow studies that see mediation practice as the productive forces in renewing religious formation (Spyer 2008; Meyer 2009). Therefore, in this project, I would like to see how the mediation practices of saint-making is intertwined with the urbanity of Jakarta.

I consider urbanity as a productive process where residents struggle to conceive social collaboration and networks of opportunities through a spatial process. I follow a number of scholars who see the connection between cultural practices and the economy in constituting urbanity (Hansen and Vaa 2004; Robinson 2006; Simone 2004). In this way, I am striving to understand religion or other kinds of spiritual forms not as fixed products derived from sacred text but as a platform that enables various urban actors to come up with their articulations. Religion as an urban engagement has particular characteristics in facilitating residents' everyday goals. How can we understand the negotiation between religiosity and urbanity through the process of making a saint visible?

On the one hand, making the urban renewal action visible is a part of everyday news of Indonesian TV. In contemporary Jakartan life, making the practices of urban discipline by Public Order officers (*satpol PP*) a spectacle is a regular thing done by the city-state. Usually, the city-state invites the print press and TV journalists to cover the officer in the act of demolishing illegal houses or using harassment and intimidation to deal with squatters, illegal street vendors and other marginalized urban groups. By making visible the officers' actions, the government hopes to effectively make report of government work and to establish a sense of regulation being enforced.

On the other hand, making the visibility of a saint through the production of his miraculous narrations has been part of Tariqa Alawiya tradition. It is common for the popularity of a saint (*waliyuallah*) to be contingent on miracle stories narrating his biography. There are about eleven Habaib tombs in Jakarta – but why are only four of them regarded as important? The descendants of Mbah Priok (Habib Hasan Alhadad) had tried several times to report to the media some miracles that occurred at and around the tomb. For instance, *Kompas*, the biggest national newspaper, reported in 2007 the conflict between the Habib Alhadad descendants and Pelindo company. In the news, the descendants of Habib Ali Alhadad mentioned Pelindo's attempt to evict the tomb that failed as the bulldozer broke down and the workers got sick. However, that miraculous story did not boost the tomb's popularity as much as the 2010 clash.

When these two things collide into an event, however, it becomes something extraordinary, it becomes *a platform for association*. The visibility of Mbah Priok's clash on TV enable “strangers” to take part in the incident. It is misleading to think that the crowds defending the tomb were the adherents. Unexpectedly, I met Arman in a congregation of *Majelis Rasulullah* in Tanjung Priok and he told me about his experience joining the clash. Arman was a young boy who was born in Madura. When he was still in school, Arman had been helping his father sell shirts and trousers as an illegal street vendor at *Pasar Permai* (permai market). Three months before Mbah Priok's clash, the public order officers obviated illegal sellers at the market. It was a serious clash even though there were no casualties and many Madura sellers lost their space in the market. When the Mbah Priok clash occurred, many of the Madurese ex-sellers of

Permai market joined the fight against the officers because of their resentment rather than their belief in the saint.

The consequence of being visible in public is the chance for other actors to tap into *the platform*. Everyone from the president to militant leaders have been trying to be a part of the process, in turn elevating their reputation. Under the rubric “cultural heritage”, the president met the descendants of Mbah Priok to show his concern with a problem connected with Islamic public (*ummah*). But at the same time, the presidential approval helped to enlarge the tomb context, from a mere part of Islamic public into a “national asset”. Habib Rizique, who was recently released from prison on a charge on violence and religious intolerance, used the clash as his stage to reappear on public.

Being public is also creates a chance for unexpected actors to get involved. In July 2010, three months after the clash, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI), the Indonesian Muslim Cleric Council announced their investigation into the case of Habib Hasan Alhaddad. The council had two important conclusions that revealed that in fact the tomb and the sainthood of Habib Hasan was a fraud (Madani Institute 2010). The council did not believe Habib Hasan to be a saint and only recognized him to be a devoted Muslim. The council’s first conclusion was that the tomb was actually empty. The corpse of Habib Hasan Alhadad or Mbah Priok had been officially transferred to another graveyard (Semper site) in 1997 under the militaristic threat of Soeharto. In 1999, a year after Soeharto stepped down, the descendants returned to the Koja location and started reconstructing the tomb without the corpse in it. The second conclusion was related to history: MUI concluded that the story of Mbah Priok is a fabrication. The history of Tanjung Priok is not appertained to the arrival of Habib Hasan

AlHadad in the area. Habib Hasan's intention in visiting Jakarta was to make a pilgrimage to the tomb of Habib Husein bin Abu Bakar Alaydrus in Keramat Luar Batang and he died on the sea as his ship had been caught by a storm.

This case shows of how religion and politics are visibly played out in the city. The tomb has been transformed from mere a religious site into an emergence form of social collaboration. Such a transformation is elevated by the public visibility of violent evictions as urban rupture. As religiosity is a part of the dominant icons in current Indonesian public culture, the violent events display the significance of rupture as social generator. Instead of seeing urban/religious clash as a problem that puts a stop to the city's undertakings, I tend to approach the rupture as a shock and extra-ordinary moment that opens up the possibility of various figures for becoming. I suggest looking at the process of saint-making as a part of how the city is disciplined and the responses to these disciplinary forms on the part of the majority of urban residents.

In one my visits to the office of *Alkisah* Magazine in November 2011, I was fortunate to meet Habib Jufri Segaf who apparently had a weekly study group in South Tanjung Priok. Habib Jufri expressed his dissatisfaction with MUI in following up their investigation on the Mbah Priok case. As Habib Jufri said, "It has been a year since MUI announced their findings about the religious fraud of Mbah Priok. They should take action in closing that tomb!" As I am writing this report, the case remain in progress and many actors are "waiting" to see whether another rupture will occur at the same node.

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